

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 IO-14 DPW-01 CIAE-00

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RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 AID-20

NIC-01 DRC-01 /183 W

----- 035015

R 050601Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY WARSAW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6858

INFO AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMCONSUL CAN THO

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L WARSAW 6187

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, VS, PFOR, PL, US

SUBJECT: US-POLISH BILATERAL RELATIONS: VIETNAM,

ICCS, AND PA&E EMPLOYEES

REFS: (A) WARSAW 5962; (B) STATE 229145; (C) WARSAW 6140;

(D) SAIGON 20301; (E) SAIGON 20240; (F) SAIGON 20304

1. I CALLED ON POLISH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SPASOWSKI
DECEMBER 3 TO TOLLOUP ON PA&E EMPLOYEES AND TO RAISE
THE QUESTION OF TWO RECENT ARTICLES IN ZYCIE WARSZAWY.

2. I GAVE SPASOWSKI A COPY OF THE PRG SPOKESMAN'S
STATEMENT OF DECEMBER 1 (REFTEL E) AND MADE TO HIM
THE POINTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL D, SUGGESTING THAT THE
VISIT OF NGUYEN HUU THO TO WARSAW PROVIDED A GOOD
OCCASION FOR A FURTHER MENTION OF THE CASE TO THE PRG,
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IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT THOUGHT THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.
SPASOWSKI SAID HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD GIVE URGENT
CONSIDERATION TO THE QUESTION OF RAISING THE MATTER
NOW WITH THE PRG PARTY. HE ADDED THAT THERE WERE

OCCASIONS WHEN REPEATED MENTIONS OF A SUBJECT MIGHT PROVE TO BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE.

3. I SAID THAT WE IN THE EMBASSY HAD BEEN DISTURBED TO READ AN ARTICLE IN ZYCIE WARSZAWY OF NOVEMBER 16, THE HEADLINE OF WHICH TERMED THE PARIS AGREEMENT A "DEAD LETTER". I SAID WE HAD BEEN FURTHER DISTURBED TO READ IN THE SAME PAPER'S ISSUE OF DECEMBER 2-3 AN ARTICLE, WELCOMING THE VISIT OF HUU, WHICH CONTAINS THE SENTENCE: "INDEED, THIEU'S BOYCOTTING OF THE PARIS POLITICAL DECISIONS--WITH THE TACIT SUPPORT OF THE USA--LIES AT THE ROOTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND IS THE PRINCIPAL REASON WHY THE SHOOTING HAS NOT YET STOPPED IN THAT TORTURED LAND". I SAID THAT THESE ARTICLES TYPIFIED THE REASONS FOR OUR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ACTIVITY--OR, RATHER, LACK OF EFFECTIVE ACTIVITY--OF THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE ICCS. THEY WERE NOT OBJECTIVE, BUT RATHER PRESENTED A COMPLETELY ONE-SIDED EXPLANATION OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN SOUTH VIETNAM. MOREOVER, THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS A "DEAD LETTER" WORRIED US; IF THIS REFLECTED THE VIEW OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, WE SHOULD HAVE CAUSE FOR VERY GREAT CONCERN, UNFORTUNATELY, I HAD NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE MODE OF OPERATION OF THE POLISH ICCS DELEGATION SINCE AMBASSADOR KULAGA HAD TAKEN OVER ITS DIRECTION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE FAILURE TO ACT AND OBSTRUCTIONISM OF THE POLISH DELEGATION WERE AS MARKED AS EVER. IN SUPPORT OF THIS CHARACTERIZATION, I SUMMARIZED THE PARTICULARS LISTED IN REFTEL F. AT THIS SEASON, I SAID, WE WERE SUMMING UP WHAT HAD HAPPENED DURING THE PAST YEAR AND LOOKING FORWARD TO WHAT MIGHT AND SHOULD HAPPEN DURING THE NEXT YEAR. IT WAS THEREFORE PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE THAT MY CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH ICCS DELEGATION HAD TO CONTINUE TO BE SO NEGATIVE. FINALLY, I SAID THAT WE HAD EARLIER AGREED WE WOULD EXCHANGE VIEWS ON PROBLEMS AS CONFIDENTIAL

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THEY AROSE. IF THE ZYCIE WARSZAWY ARTICLES REPRESENTED THE BEGINNING OF A TREND--WHICH MIGHT PERHAPS BE GIVEN EVEN MORE STRIKING EXPRESSION IN THE EXCHANGES OF TOASTS AND SPEECHES DURING NGUYEN HUU THOS'S VISIT--AND WE SHOULD BEGIN EXCHANGING IN PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, I COULD FORESEE AN INCREASING STRAIN ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE POINTS I HAD MADE, SPASOWSKI SAID: (A) THE POLISH GOVERNMENT EMPHATICALLY DID NOT REGARD THE PARIS AGREEMENT AS A "DEAD LETTER", BUT RATHER AS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT AGREEMENT. THE POSITION OF

THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS THAT IT WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE FULFILLMENT OF ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND DEPLORED ANY DEPARTURE FROM IT. THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VIEWED AS A PACKAGE OF PROVISIONS, ALL OF WHICH SHOULD BE FULFILLED. IN THE VIEW OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT, THE AGREEMENT WAS A REAL SUCCESS FOR ALL CONCERNED. "WE GENUINELY BELIEVE THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WOULD PREFER NOT TO BE ENGAGED IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN VIETNAM AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE PEACE RETURN TO THAT COUNTRY". WHILE WE MIGHT READ CRITICAL STATEMENTS IN THE POLISH PRESS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH VIETNAM, THE POSITION OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS THAT THE PARIS AGREEMENT SHOULD BE FULLY OBSERVED. (B) "WE WERE NOT PLEASED TO WITHDRAW THE FIVE TEAMS". THE POSITION OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WAS THAT IT WOULD DO WHAT IS PROVIDED FOR IN THE PARIS AGREEMENT. THE GOP HAD SAID THE SAME THING TO THE OTHER SIDE (I.E., TO THE DRV AND PRG). (C) WITH REGARD TO THE REDUCTION OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE POLISH ICCS DELEGATION, IT WAS TRUE THAT THERE WERE FEWER PEOPLE IN VIETNAM THAN THERE HAD BEEN AT THE BEGINNING. THIS WAS A RESULT OF THE ROTATION; IF PERSONNEL WERE IDLE, IT WAS FELT THEY SHOULD NOT BE LEFT IN VIETNAM DOING NOTHING. BUT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO DECISION TO REDUCE THE PERSONNEL OF ITS DELEGATION. (D) WITH REGARD TO THE ICCS BUDGET, THE DRV AND PRG WILL NOT AGREE TO A BUDGET OF AROUND \$40 MILLION AND HAVE NOTIFIED THE ICCS THAT THE BUDGET SHOULD NOT BE LARGER THAN \$18 MILLION. TO A CERTAIN CONFIDENTIAL

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EXTENT, THE GOP CAN UNDERSTAND THEIR POSITION; IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO CONTRIBUTE SO MUCH IN VIEW OF THE NEED TO REBUILD THE WAR-TORN COUNTRY. MEANWHILE, ALL THE DELEGATIONS ARE EXAMINING THE SITUATION, INCLUDING THE IRANIANS, WHO DO NOT YET HAVE THEIR FULL STAFF IN VIETNAM AND WHO ARE TRYING TO PLAN THEIR PERSONNEL NEEDS. (E) FOR THE POLES, THE MAIN QUESTION ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH FULFILLMENT OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT IS THAT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE SIDES. WITHOUT PROGRESS IN THIS RESPECT, THE GENUINE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT CAN HARDLY BE FORESEEN. THESE TWO SIDES SHOULD COME TO TERMS, INSTEAD OF FIGHTING EACH OTHER. THEY SHOULD TRY TO FIND A COMMON BASIS FOR UNDERSTANDING.

5. I SAID THAT I WAS REASSURED TO LEARN THAT THE GOP CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE PARIS AGREEMENT SO FIRMLY. IN THAT CASE, IT SEEMED ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT TO ME THAT THERE BE CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THAT SUPPORT, IN THE SHAPE OF OBJECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL FULFILLMENT BY THE POLISH DELEGATION OF ITS OBLIGATIONS IN THE ICCS. IT WAS THIS WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, WAS STILL LACKING. I HOPED THAT, THE STATE OF HIS HEALTH PERMITTING, IT WOULD BE

POSSIBLE FOR ME TO SEE AMBASSADOR KULAGA DURING HIS
STAY IN WARSAW. SPASOWSKI SAID KULAGA WAS DUE TO
ARRIVE DECEMBER 4 FROM PARIS; HE WOULD GO STRAIGHT
FROM THE AIRPORT TO THE HOSPITAL, SINCE THE
POLES WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE MEDICAL REPORTS
THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM SAIGON. IF THE MEDICAL REPORTS
JUSTIFIED HIS RETURN TO SAIGON, KULAGA WOULD
RETURN TO PRESIDE OVER THE ICCS IN JANUARY. SPASOWSKI
THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE A MEETING ONCE
KULAGA'S MEDICAL EXAMINATION WAS COMPLETED. I SAID
THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE, SINCE I HAD HEARD NOTHING
HERE IN WARSAW WHICH CONSTITUTED WHAT I WOULD REGARD
AS AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION FOR THE LACK OF
ACTIVITY BY THE POLISH DELEGATION IN THE DIRECTION OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE PARIS
AGREEMENT. SPASOWSKI SAID HE HAD TRIED TO GIVE ME AN
EXPOSITION OF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S VIEW OF THE
PRINCIPLES IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHICH THE DELEGATION
ACTED, BUT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR BOTH OF US TO
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HEAR FROM KULAGA HOW THIS VERY COMPLEX SITUATION LOOKED
TO THE MAN ON THE SPOT IN SAIGON.
DAVIES

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